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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a lightweight cipher scheme aimed at the scalable extension of the High
Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) codec, referred to as the Scalable HEVC (SHVC) standard. This stream
cipher, Symmetric Cipher for Lightweight Encryption based on Permutation and EXlusive OR (SLEPX),
applies Selective Encryption (SE) over suitable coding syntax elements in the SHVC layers. This is achieved
minimal computational complexity and delay. The algorithm also conserves most SHVC functionalities,
i.e. preservation of bit-length, decoder format-compliance, and error resilience. For comparative analysis,
results were taken and compared with other state-of-art ciphers i.e. Exclusive-OR (XOR) and the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). The performance of SLEPX is also compared with existing video SE solutions
to confirm the efficiency of the adopted scheme. The experimental results demonstrate that SLEPX is as
secure as AES in terms of visual protection, while computationally efficient comparable with a basic XOR
cipher. Visual quality assessment, security analysis and extensive cryptanalysis (based on numerical values of
selected binstrings) also showed the effectiveness of SLEPX’s visual protection scheme for SHVC compared
to previously-employed cryptographic techniques.
INDEX TERMS Selective encryption, HEVC, SHVC, CABAC, CDN as a Service, middlebox, quality
metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In terms of bandwidth utilization, the main content that is cur-
rently transferred over the Internet is visual multimedia [1],
i.e. video and still images, with applications such as Video-
on-Demand (VoD), video conferencing, video phone, and
telemedicine. Multimedia content requires a strong compres-
sion method, one that sufficiently reduces the bitrate over the
transmission medium because otherwise, even in compressed
form, its bitrate can be significant. Video content is stored
and forwarded in numerous formats, differing in terms of
frame rate, video quality, spatial resolution, bit depth and
codecwhen fulfilling thewide spectrum of user requirements,
including mobile users. However, the process of encoding,
adaptation and delivering video consumes substantial stor-
age resources as well as bandwidth. One way to address
this issue is to use a state-of-the-art, standardized video
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Nilanjan Dey.
codec [2], as video codecs have tended to almost double their
compression ratio every decade [3]. Standardized codecs,
such as those of the Motion Picture Experts Group (MPEG)
series [4], guarantee the exchange of compressed video
content. However, commercial operators should ensure that
licensing issues are resolved [5]. Further, a scalable stan-
dardized codec is a flexible way to code in advance for the
variety of expected video configurations requested by client
devices, allow a set of video configurations to be embedded
in a single compressed bitstream, which are subsequently
extracted at a server or at an intermediate point in the network
path.
The Scalable High Efficiency Video Coding extension
(SHVC) [6], has been designed as Annex-H of the High Effi-
ciency Video Coding (HEVC) codec standard [7], to encode
the same video as a single bitstream, in a number of dif-
ferent configurations, such as a varying number of quality
layers, resolutions, and frame rates. Compared to the prior
Scalable Video Coding (SVC) standard [8] based on the
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H.264/Advanced Video Coding (AVC) codec standard [9],
SHVC provides two key advantages. Firstly, SHVC has a
coding architecture simply built upon the HEVC standard and
inter-layer prediction, consequently needing to make only
relatively minor, high-level alterations. Secondly, the official
release date of SHVC, being only one and half years later than
HEVC’s official release, in 2013, made the scalable extension
relatively easier to deploy, without the need to account for
many subsequent upgrades to HEVC. As SHVC is based on
HEVC so it provides greater compression efficiency com-
pared to the previous SVC standard but further computational
complexity [10] has to be coped with in terms of additional
encoding latency, as indeed happens with HEVC compared to
H.264/AVC. The principal cause of that computational com-
plexity are the number of coding choices made during tem-
poral or inter prediction, which takes up to 70% of encoding
time. Consequently, efforts started shortly after the introduc-
tion of HEVC [11] to streamline the prediction mode process,
with the potential to reduce encoding complexity and, hence,
encoding latency by between 30 to 50%. An entirely different
method of encoding, other than by existing hybrid codecs,
is through fractal coding [12]. Unfortunately, research interest
has generally been limited due to the patents that exist for
fractal coding, which has led to its rejection for commercial
purposes.
Confidential, scalable bit-stream distribution is presently
a desirable feature for multimedia applications over
digital devices, including for real-time applications such as
cloud-based video conferencing. Whatever the application,
protection of the content is essential to make marketing
feasible for a video streaming service, as otherwise there
would be no financial encouragement to create videos and
share them. Likewise users, especially businesses, will be
concerned if there were to be a threat to the confidential-
ity of their VoD streams or indeed confidential, real-time
streams such as those arising from telemedicine or video
surveillance. New applications of video streaming continue to
appear. For example, substantial streams of video are being
newly accessed by users in countries such as Namibia [13]
in south-western Africa, where wide-area wireless LANs
are preferred in the absence of fixed networks. However,
even if the configuration of the wireless packet sizes can be
intelligently managed [13] such schemes lack protection of
content, for which the proposal herein could be a solution.
Added to that distributed management of such streaming
and its protection might become advantageous, allowing
lightweight encryption protection of the streamed video, with
the degree of protection according to local device capability
arranged intelligently [14]. Thus, encryption stands in the
way of unlawful or illicit access to a video server’s content
and also shields the video stream during transmission over
the Internet. For instance, the HTTP Live Streaming (HLS)
specification [15] suggests deploying full encryption upon
video segments using the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [16] with a 128-bit key, as well as Encrypted Media
Extensions (EME)-based specification for key management
of HTML5 video [17]. The Real-Time Messaging Proto-
col (RTMP) also provides full encryption based on the
symmetric Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream cipher (now con-
sidered cryptographically insecure [18]) or better, enclosed
inside a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session, which uses
asymmetric encryption for initial key exchange. However,
full encryption, with HLS or RTMP (for example) tackles
video data as being essentially textural and does not exploit
the basic features of encoded video streams. Subsequently,
the practice of full encryption increases the performance
overhead [19] in terms of both bitrate overhead and possibly
computational overhead. It also creates additional security
weaknesses and processing latency if intermediate video
adaptation should prove necessary, as discussed hereafter.
As a result of the short-comings of full encryption,
to encrypt a video stream, Selective Encryption (SE) is prefer-
able, as the amount of data encrypted with SE is reduced [20],
which proportionally affects the processing latency at the
codec and subsequently, if adaptation is involved. In addition,
SE of video streams can be made decoder format compatible.
In other words, because the format of an encrypted (and com-
pressed) bitstreammatches the specification of a standardized
codec such as HEVC and its extensions, it can be decoded
at intermediate devices in a network or while at rest in a
cloud, without the need for the decryption that occurs with
full encryption. Typical video adaptation includes splicing
(or multiplexing) of other video clip bitstreams within the
main bitstream, as would be needed for targeted advertising,
no-reference video quality monitoring [21], and watermark-
ing, as might be needed for the insertion of logos or to
allow covert tracing of a video’s source or destination [22].
Watermarking can serve as a form of retrospective content
protection, usually working in conjunction with encryption.
Some watermarking schemes can also be applied in the
compressed domain, reducing the latency of the adaptation.
A video splice should anyway be separately decodable but
a problem arises if watermarks are inserted after the initial
compression because the lack of synchronization between
encoder and decoder will result in error drift over time at
the decoder. In fact, watermarks should ideally be inserted
in the main encoding loop because inserting before compres-
sion means that encoding constitutes an attack on the water-
mark. Insertion in the main encoding loop should ideally be
after quantization because again quantization could otherwise
harm the watermark. Watermarks, which are mostly applied
covertly, have the advantage that removing a watermark usu-
ally involves severe distortion of watermarked video frames.
However, there exist disadvantages as well. In a real-time
environment the cost of decoding with a watermark in place
increases, which may lead to a need for a simple water-
mark to be designed, which in turn opens that watermark
to tampering. For the same reason, if there is a need within
an application to remove one watermark and insert another,
this could also lead to a simple watermark that could be
tampered with. Even if a watermark needs to be designed to
resist the many types of attack that have been devised against
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them [23], there is no accepted standard for their use and legal
doubts exist as to their enforceability. Returning to SE, if the
scheme used to perform SE is not format compatible, such
as in [24], applied to encrypt intra-coded I-frames, then the
problem of full-encryption remains, even though the latency
of decryption is reduced by virtue of the reduced amount of
data encrypted within the bitstream. Instead, the current paper
proposes a new lightweight encryption scheme, which is
decoder format compatible and is applicable as SE for SHVC
encoders. Notice that in standardized codecs, standardization
is enforced by specification of the compressed bitstream sent
to the decoder. Thus, a bitstream should be format compatible
to be decodable.
Creating an SHVC stream is intended to avoid the need
for transcoding, as the relevant segment from the composite
bitstream, see Section II, can be extracted according to the
configuration of the client device. For example, if the target
device, acting as a client to a video server were to signal that
in some way it has a screen with a limited spatial resolution,
or a decoding rate that restricts the display frame rate, or a
reduced bandwidth that does not allow high quality video to
be sent to it, for example over a wireless network, then the
matching segments can be extracted. In fact, SHVC, unlike
SVC, also allows [25] selection of the color gamut, bit depth
and even the base-layer codec. However, some devices, espe-
ciallymobile onesmay not have a hardware codec chipset that
matches that of SHVC or even a software SHVC. In which
case, codec format transcoding, e.g. [26], could become nec-
essary at the MANE. For some video adaptation applications,
such as watermark insertion or codec format conversion,
it may be necessary to ensure that the bits affected by the
application are not part of the SE scheme, though this is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
It should be mentioned that commercial solutions for
the lucrative infotainment sector of the market have tended
to select an alternative method of multi-format streaming,
typically based on an advanced form of HTTP Adaptive
Streaming (HAS) [27], for example HLS [15], in which a
device (client side) can dynamically opt for the most suit-
able format of video from diverse representations of the
same video according to the best available device config-
urations. There are trade-offs in terms of storage (higher
for HAS-type solutions) compared to bandwidth utilization
(higher in the case of scalable solutions). There are also
comparisons to be made when a real-time streaming service
is the target, which is now topical in the current circum-
stances, for video conferencing using a cloud-based multi-
point server. As an example, [28] contains a proposal for a
scalable, video-conferencing scheme for real-time applica-
tions such as telehealth, even before the current marketplace
for video conferencing took off.
A common misconception is that only selectively encrypt-
ing the Base-Layer (BL) output by a scalable codec is suf-
ficient for content privacy. This notion is based upon the
utilization of the base reference layer within the Enhancement
Layers (ELs). Unfortunately, enhancement layers also
contain intra-coded data parts, so that video data remains vis-
ible [29]. Likewise, encryption applied only on enhancement
layer does not yield acceptable outcomes. Therefore, the pro-
posed cipher, called Symmetric Cipher for Lightweight
Encryption based onPermutation and EXclusive ORSLEPX,
acts upon both the base and enhancement layers’ data and can
do this by means of diverse selections for encryption.
The SE based ciphering scheme proposed in this research
paper has the following contributions compared to the tradi-
tional ones:
• SLEPX is based on a SE method that deals with
uniformly-distributed syntax elements in the encoded
video stream. Due to this approach, the encrypted video
stream preserves the statistical properties of the bit-
stream and its length.
• The decryption scheme is always accomplished at the
target device end, without involving any intermediate
device (such as within a Content Delivery Network
(CDN)— see Section II.C), where otherwise the decryp-
tion keys and/or content may be visible. This stipula-
tion implies that video is not decrypted prior to video
adaptation.
• SE is performed at the last stage of SHVC encoder
pipeline (the entropy-coding stage) as a joint
cryptographic-compression scheme. As a result, there
is limited computational overhead and, importantly,
the encoding statistics established at earlier stages (such
as changes to the correlation during frequency trans-
forms) remain intact.
• The choice of which syntax elements to encrypt is deter-
mined both by the need to preserve the statistical prop-
erties of the bitstream and allow seamless intermediate
video adaptation but also by the need to application
across all the layers of the scalable video, as developed
in Section IV-D.
• Choosing SE in place of full encryption opens up a
threat that the content of a video may not be appro-
priately distorted and, as a result, the video content
may be revealed without using the legitimate decryp-
tion process. Thus, additional video quality metrics are
applied in this paper’s work to check that the distor-
tion of the video content is substantial so that only
when absolute secrecy is needed, such as for military,
legal, or some medical applications, is full encryption
preferable. In fact, in an implementation, no-reference
video quality metrics could be applied at a Media Aware
Network Element (MANE) (see Section II.C) without
the need for SLEPX decryption.
• Therefore, a vital contribution of this paper is the
employment of the proposed SE algorithm with both
HEVC [30] and SHVC [2] encoding. In fact, to find the
effectiveness of the scheme, different experiments are
reported that estimate: file sizes, the computation costs
involved, and the effect, as part of the SE procedure,
of choosing diverse syntax elements of those codecs’
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Context Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC)
entropy coder [31].
• Frequently, the standardized AES cipher [16] is uti-
lized for full encryption and also for the selected
data encrypted as part of SE, prior to placing them
back within their original positions within the com-
pressed data. However, it is worth noting that in
terms of images, AES may have poor resistance to
cropping and noise attacks. Regardless of its security
strength [32], AES involves multiple encryption rounds,
which consume considerable computation. SLEPX is a
cryptographically-scalable cipher as it can choose nom-
inated syntax elements during entropy coding and it
can reduce the computational load when subsequently
encrypting those syntax elements. Thus, it remains in
comparison to AES, a lightweight cipher, capable of
superseding other ciphers for streamed video, especially
when real-time communication is involved.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section II
introduces the background concepts of the SHVC encoder
and the SE-based schemes utilized in this paper, as well as
CDN-based applications. Section III follows with a review of
related and recent research in the field. Section IV formulates
the design of the proposed SLEPX cipher for the SHVC
encoder. To determine the effectiveness of SLEPX, a variety
of experiments have been conducted, which, in Section V,
answer questions about the pictorial distortions achieved and
computational overheads. In that Section also, the advantages
of SLEPX over conventional ciphers are analyzed, finish-
ing by discussing the effectiveness of a SLEPX-based secu-
rity scheme for SHVC video bitstreams. Finally, Section VI
makes some concluding remarks concerning this research,
highlighting its significance.
II. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
This Section provides overviews of the major modules of the
scheme rather than full explanations of these modules. Above
all, this Section outlines the SHVC and SE methods applied
in this paper, as well as describing how SHVC would operate
in a CDN.
A. SHVC
The ITU-T Video Coding Experts Group (VCEG) and
ISO/IEC Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) requested
proposals for the new scalable extension of the HEVC
standard in July 2012 [2]. As a result, in October 2012,
20 different responses were received from research insti-
tutes, companies and academic institutes. As with HEVC,
the scalable extension of HEVC was also developed under
the supervision of the JCT-VC committee. Earlier video
coding standards which were upgraded with scalable versions
include H.262/MPEG-2 [33], H.263 standard [34], MPEG-4
Visual standard [35], and H.264/AVC [36]. The H.264/AVC
extension to deal with scalable video is called as Scalable
Video Coding (SVC), which is the most recent scalable video
coding standard preceding SHVC.
Scalable encoding delivers multiple layers of the same
coded video, each and every layer having distinct quality
attributes for the same video scene. One of the layers is
named as the BL having the lowest quality by some crite-
rion. Though video quality (strictly Signal-to-Noise (SNR)
ratio — Peak SNR (PSNR) for video) is the main scaling
criterion (and there are other video quality metrics, including
those based on the Human Visual System (HVS)), scaling
can be by temporal (i.e. frame-rate) and/or spatial resolution
(pixels per video frame). Other layers are referred to as ELs,
providing enhanced video quality (and/or temporal and /or
spatial resolution) when combined with the BL and are coded
by referencing lower layers in the coding hierarchy stemming
from the BL. Scalable video codecs only decode the subdivi-
sion (fragment) of a layer belonging to a scalable video bit-
stream that provides the lowest still-acceptable video quality
compared to the fully decoded video bitstream. Consequently,
they provide graceful degradation of the video compared with
conventional non-scalable video bitstreams, when severely
degraded video may result if there is an attempt to reduce the
bitrate, once the video has already been encoded.
Alternatives to scalability are either transcoding or simul-
cast. In transcoding, the whole bitstream is often decoded and
re-encoded with different encoding parameters, though it is
possible to transcode through a partial decode by operating in
the compression domain [26]. Video transcoding represents
additional delay in the network path, (see Section II.C), which
is why alternatives to full decoding are sometimes sought,
especially if the cost of a hardware bank of transcoders is
undesirable. Simulcast is based on distinct encodings of the
same video sequence, clip, or film, at dissimilar bit rates
owing to different video quality (usually achieved through
different Quality Parameters (QPs) [4]) and possibly at
diverse frame rates or spatial resolutions. At the receiving
side, decoders may opt for specific simulcast bitstreams to
be transmitted, as a response to network congestion causing
display latency and or device capability. Though there has
been progress in getting simulcast codecs to encode at real-
time, there remains the issue of storage of multiple layers,
which can be a problem for a server on a mobile device.
A scalable video scheme provides benefits in multicast
protocols, i.e. comprising streaming, broadcast, and video
conferencing where multiple receivers request diverse ver-
sions of the same video. Scalable coding at real-time rates is
common, as it has already been used for n-to-n video confer-
encing [28], where n is the number of conference participants.
However, it can also be utilized for 1 to n video conferenc-
ing, in which n streams are collated at a multipoint server,
possibly sited in a cloud data center, before being transmitted
as a composite stream, with different versions transmit-
ted, depending on device capabilities at the receiver ends.
Capabilities include spatial resolution or supported frame
rate of the display, computation rate and available energy for
decoding.
As previously mentioned, there are traditionally three
major categories of video scalability – Temporal, Spatial,
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FIGURE 1. Different versions of scalability i.e. temporal, spatial and SNR
scalability.
and Quality, see Fig. 1. To support the Ultra High Definition
(UHD) video format in SHVC, three new kinds of scalability
were additionally introduced, i.e. color gamut, bit depth,
and hybrid codec scalability — for example combining a
non-HEVC BL, e.g. H.264/AVC BL, with HEVC ELs [25]
(hybrid scalability does not extend beyond the BL in SHVC).
However, for simplicity the following discussion does not
extend beyond the traditional forms of scalability.
SHVC works only with top-level syntax elements, gener-
ally at the Video Parameter Set (VPS) header level [7]. Syntax
elements deliver statistics about the video layers such as the
total number of layers, and for individual layers: their resolu-
tion, bit depth and the inter-layer dependencies. The SHVC
architecture contains a number of HEVC encoders and is con-
sidered as a single encoder which encodes individual layers
by utilizing N number of layers: in which there is one BL and
N − 1 ELs. In the context of the spatial scalability of SHVC,
the HEVC encoder of the BL encodes an original video with
an inferior resolution and forwards it to the first EL codec,
which decodes the frame, including its Motion Vector (MV)
information. The EL encoders (numbered L = 2, . . ., N-1)
encode videos of higher resolution by means of the previous
encoded frames from a lower layer, which supply a reference
frame. The inter-layer reference frame is up-sampled, as are
its MVs. Fig. 2 depicts the spatial scalability architecture
when an SHVC encoder encodes two layers. In the case of
quality scalability, each layer has the same resolution, but
inter-layer processing between the reference frame and the
EL encoding takes place rather than up-sampling. Subse-
quently the QP of frames are successively reduced in the
ELs. Similar arrangements take place for temporal scalability,
except that the reference frames passed to an EL are chosen
according to the desired (lower) frame rate of that EL. Clearly
in SHVC, it is possible to combine the three traditional forms
of scalability within the same composite bitstream.
From the encryption point of view, it is important to notice
that in an SHVC encoder, in each layer the final stage of
the hybrid encoder is an entropy coder [31], which remains
untouched, being the same as that of HEVC that is the
CABAC coder mentioned in Section I. Thus, each layer in
the SHVC encoder contains an autonomous CABAC engine
acting as and entropy coder (see Fig. 2). Each CABAC engine
performs three major functions: binarization, context model-
ing and arithmetic coding [4]. Initially, syntax elements of
the video bitstream, if not in suitable binary form already,
are converted into binary symbols (bins) in the binarization
step to form binstrings. Notice that there are multiple alter-
native ways to perform binarization according to the type of
symbol. There are additional binary code-trees available in
FIGURE 2. Block diagram of the SHVC encoder encoding two spatially scalable layers.
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HEVC compared to H.264/AVC, basic examples being unary
code, truncated unary code, truncated Rice code, kth order
Exp-Golomb codes, and fixed-length codes. Notice that some
basic codes are combined in HEVC, as is the case for the
REG0, which combines kth order Exp-Golomb codes with
fixed-length codes. Secondly, the probabilities of some of the
binstrings are updated in the context modeling step, unless
fixed or predetermined contexts are used. The binstrings that
do not have their probabilities updated are important for
format compliant SE and as such are further considered in
Section IV-A. Finally, whether an adaptive or fixed context
has been used binary arithmetic coding [4] is employed to
compress the binstrings into bits. As presented in Fig. 2,
multiplexing is performed on the outputs of the two encoders
(one for each layer) to make a single composite bitstream
that conforms to the SHVC standard. As is usual, it is the
bitstream that is standardized rather than the encoder and
every compliant SHVC decoder must be able to decode such
a bitstream.
B. SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION
Selective Encryption (SE) is an efficient way [26] to render
video contents confidential by making them sufficiently dis-
torted. To achieve that, in the SLEPX scalable encryption
scheme, according to a range of criteria, the most effec-
tive syntax elements are selected from the encoded video
frames and encryption is applied only to those elements.
Fig. 3 is an illustrative example of that distortion, which in
this case renders the sports broadcast unwatchable. Due to the
reduction in the amount of encrypted material, SE decreases
computational costs compared to conventional full encryp-
tion [24]. In fact, full encryption of a standardized bitstream
also removes its format compliance, making it no longer
necessarily decodable by a decoder, which implies that a
decoder could crash if decryption did not take place before
decoding. SE is often utilized in real-time applications of
video streaming such as video conferencing, video phone,
and telemedicine. However, not all SE schemes offer suffi-
cient data protection. Some SE algorithms have flaws in terms
of: lack of decoder format compliance, additional bit-rate
overhead, and unsatisfactory confidentiality. However, gen-
erally, the said issues can be overcome by deploying SE at
the last stage of an encoder, i.e. the entropy-coding phase,
FIGURE 3. Illustrative example video frame with SE to make the frame
unwatchable.
by choice of suitable syntax elements to encrypt, as well as
determining that the statistical distributions of the selected
syntax elements will not be changed [37]. Only then does SE
become beneficial, as there is no extra bit-rate overhead.
The SE algorithm employed in this paper operates with
the CABAC entropy coder, which is the only entropy
coder specified for HEVC [7]. It has an extended range
of options compared to the H.264/AVC CABAC coder.
The H.264/AVC family of codecs also had the option of
Context-Adaptive Variable-Length (CAVLC) coding [38],
which traded faster operation for increased bitrate (around
15% according to [39]). Either coder is inherently lossless.
CABAC contains a number of parameters which could be
employed during the encryption operation, i.e. Motion Vec-
tor Differences (MVDs); Coded Block Flag; the Transform
Coefficients (TCs); the Macroblock (MB) types; the numer-
ical signs of the MVDs and TCs; and the delta QPs (dQPs).
However, not all the aforementioned syntax elements deliver
decoder compliance and are also appropriate for scalable
encoding due to this we only choose: theMVD signs, together
with the Non-Zero-TC (NZ_TC) signs and their absolute
value suffixes. The purpose of that selection is to ensure for-
mat compliance and constant bit-rate encryption. The latter
is achieved because it is likely that the population of each
of the signs will assume a Uniform distribution, before and
after encryption, for sufficiently long video stream. Notice
that encryption of MVD suffixes is omitted because, though
their encryption would have a significant impact upon dis-
tortion, it would also break format compliance [28]. Finally,
notice that the selection of syntax elements in this paper is
dependent on the need to work across the three traditional
scalabilities (see Section II-A) as embodied in SHVC. The
issue of why the aforementioned syntax elements are suitable
for that purpose is returned to in Section IV-D.
C. SHVC OVER A CDN
One possibility is to distribute an SHVC stream over a CDN
usingRTMP. TheCDNmight be based on a cloud and provide
the CDN as a Service (CDNaaS) [40]. As remote devices
are involved, so further issues arise if the video stream is
not confidential and secured in general, for example if key
management is not robust [41], though the latter is not the
main subject of the current paper. Unfortunately, a video con-
tent shield through encryption may result in further latency,
especially if the aforementioned intermediate decryption (as
seen in Fig. 4), is needed to allow middlebox processing [21]
before the bitstream is re-encrypted. In Fig. 4’s middlebox,
specifically a MANE, part of a CDNaaS, the traditional
arrangement still requires time consuming decryption prior to
adaptation of the decoded video bitstream, especially if full
encryption has been applied and even if compressed domain
processing is possible. Notice, however, that compressed
domain processing requires a limited amount of decoding,
for example, entropy decoding and re-coding. If it is known
that video splicing is intended at the MANE, it is important
to avoid encryption of the Network Adaptation Layer (NAL)
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FIGURE 4. Traditional set-up, requiring decryption with key distribution,
in a MANE as part of a CDNaaS.
that indicate the insertion point, which is usually possible
with SE but not full encryption, though some SE schemes
only operate on NALs [42].
Whatever the form of encryption, if intermediate decryp-
tion is required then the decryption key must be sent to each
and every MANE, where it is exposed to attack. The same
applies to content stored at rest in the cloud, where the key
might be exposed to third-party companies, other than the
cloud data center owners. Thus, full encryption presents a
major potential security weakness due to the increased need
for key distribution, given that the types of future process-
ing of encrypted video may not be knowable in advance,
i.e. whether video adaptation may eventually prove to be
necessary.
III. RELATED WORK
There are various SE methods offered in the prior research
into HEVC (sometimes known as H.265). The application of
SE to H.264/AVC has already been examined in [24], [37].
This Section also presents emerging lightweight encryption
procedures, which have also found a niche in the Internet-
of-Things (IoT) and wireless sensor networks in general
because of their need for reduced consumption of resources
In fact, SE can be applied at different stages of a hybrid
encoder, including within the header fields [42] but also
during the transform stage, during quantization, within intra-
frames only or within inter frames, and during entropy cod-
ing, which is favored in this paper for the reasons outlined in
Section II.
Considering pioneering SE techniques for HEVC CABAC
components, in [43] a novel choice of coding elements
was made, i.e. mvd_sign_flag, coeff_sign_flag, the suffix
of abs_mvd_minus2, and cu_qp_delta_abs. Once the ele-
ments had been extracted from the coded stream they were
encrypted using the AES cipher before replacing them in their
original positions in the bitstream. Cryptanalysis demon-
strated robustness to replacement attacks, amongst other
forms of attack. Computational overheadwas also very low as
compare to other suggested schemes. Thus, the scheme was
beneficial for real-time application and also for delivery to
systems having limited resources.
A real-time encryption scheme for H.264 and H.265
(HEVC) codecs appeared in [44]. The authors of [44] inserted
a symmetric encryption/decryption transcoder at the output
of a codec’s encoder and before the input to the codec’s
decoder. The advantage of this architecture is that the cipher-
ing transcoder can work independently of the codec, that it
is not integrated into the encoder and decoder software for
joint encryption/compression. It works either with CAVLC
or CABAC entropy coding. A more significant change is
probably that it does not only use bypass syntax elements
in the entropy coder but also uses regular elements. The
former elements are thought to have a Uniform distribution
and, hence, do not alter in the long term the probability of
a symbol occurring. Consequently, bypass mode symbols do
not update the probability tables maintained by an encoder.
On the other hand, regular mode elements do update the inter-
nal probability tables. The use of the encryption/decryption
transcoder allows regular mode elements to be utilized in
encryption because the tables have already been updated
before encryption takes place. Equally, as decryption takes
place before these elements reenter the decoder, they do not
affect the decoder’s tables, which, hence, replicate the prob-
ability table’s values at the encoder. The authors of [44] do
not specify which syntax elements they choose, which means
that their implementation is proprietary and their method
appears to rely on obfuscation, which is often an incentive
to those attempting to break the cipher, for example through
a replacement attack. The other main shortcoming is that
if non-bypass mode elements are encrypted then the bitrate
of the compressed bitstream could increase after encryption.
This is because the non-Uniform distributed elements may
have a lower bitrate than those of a Uniform distributed
element. On the other hand, encryption usually imposes a
Uniform distribution on those encrypted elements.
However, the authors of [44] then returned to these issues
in a journal version of [44], namely in [45]. Firstly, non-
bypass elements are specified for use in the scheme, namely
the intra-coding luma prediction modes are selected, which
improves upon the treatment of Intra-coding in other SE
schemes. Secondly, it is found that the average change to
the bitrate by ciphering these regular mode elements is an
increase of only 0.5%. However, in [45] for the HEVC-
CABAC, encryption of the intra-coding luma prediction
mode has an impact on decoder compatibility, which risks
decoder failure. In [45], the details of how this risk can be
overcome, with limited additional complexity in the symmet-
ric transcoder through the use of two sets of probability tables,
according to the size of the Intra coding unit. Only the last
coefficient is coded to make sure that the same number of
coefficients is coded in the original and encrypted versions.
Both [44] and [45] retain the use of AES encryption of the
selected bits, while, if encryption of the structural elements
in [44] and [45] (the regular mode elements, specifically
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the intra-coding mode) was retained, lighter-weight SLEPX
could be substituted.
If it is thought preferable to limit encryption to by-pass
elements of the CABAC entropy coder then [46] is particu-
larly useful, as it reports results on the impacts of encrypting
those elements, either individually or in combination with
other elements. The paper confirms that encryption of syn-
tax elements take from the CABAC by-pass engine has 0%
statistical impact on the Bjøntegaard delta (BD) rate of the
output bitstream. (The BD rate is a measure of the aver-
age rate-distortion increase in bits/s over a specified quality
range, measured in PSNR, as a result of an encoding change.)
It also ranks a set of elements in terms of the change in
PSNRwhen using them for SE, with a lower PSNR indicating
greater distortion in terms of that quality metric. The ranking
is also reported for Structural Similarity (SSIM) index change
ranking [47], with SSIM being more closely correlated to the
HVS response than PSNR for the same tests across many
video sequences, with a range of QPs. The many other obser-
vations of [46] cannot be reported in this short overview. For
example, Sample Adaptive Offset (SAO) signaling proceeds
through the bypass filter but has the least distortion impact
according to the paper’s rankings and, moreover, is frequently
turned off anyway. The authors of [46] conclude that for a
given multimedia production chain, their work can be used
to manage which elements are not involved in any middlebox
adaptation, possibly allowing compression domain changes
at the middlebox without the need to decode. That is a very
different approach to SE compared to [45], which abstracts
away the SE process, even separating it from the codec
itself.
Region-of-Interest (ROI) encryption is of particular inter-
est to video surveillance applications, when the privacy of
those surveilled is required. In [48], either the ROIs can be
tracked, for example with face recognition with video frames,
or HEVC’s rectangular tiles can form ROIs. Two SE methods
are considered, the one format compliant and the other not so.
However, whichever method is used if Motion Vectors (MVs)
are encrypted prior to subsequent compression processing
of the whole frame then there could be leakage of the MV
data to the rest of the video frame. In [48] this is avoided by
restricting the reference extent of MVs from within a ROI.
It is found that this restriction results in no more than 1 to
2.5% on the bitrate, depending on the video content and the
ROI size.
In [49] an interesting encryption scheme is outlined,
in which encryption is applied prior to compression.
Normally, encryption would not be applied prior to compres-
sion because it removes any exploitable correlation between
pixels. Nevertheless, for a resource-constrained, possibly
mobile device it may be better to perform encryption first
and then on another device with greater resources perform
compression prior to transmission. In [49] this is achieved for
a set of spatially encoded images, which could be a sequence
of video frames that are losslessly compressed. The method
also requires the existence of a secret channel in which the
first image in the sequence is transmitted. Other images are
transmitted through the normal untrusted channel. Before,
the first image is compressed a pixel sorting order is derived
from that image. The sorting order is applied to the next
image in the sequence, after which it is compressed, and so
on for subsequent images. The authors of [49] also provide
a variant of the scheme for ‘lossy’ compression. The sorting
order or permutation is said in some cases to improve upon
the existing compression performance, without encryption,
for ‘lossy’ compression. However, the test sequences are
by today’s standards small and confined to somewhat static
grayscale sequences. The main weakness of the method is
that knowledge of the first image in the sequence, which is
not encrypted but passed over a secret channel, compromises
the confidentiality of all subsequent images.
The authors of [50] also offered an encryption-then-
compression solution targeted at still images. The aim was
to improve upon the compression performance of prior such
encryption methods because according to [50], the compres-
sion ratio of prior solutions was generally weak. In [50] and
some other proposed solutions of this type, side information is
also generated which is then encrypted separately. In [50], the
side-information is the prediction error that a given predictor
would generate for each pixel’s value given the surrounding
pixels, whichmust in someway have caused the current pixel.
The prediction errors are then clustered, with the number of
clusters being a trade-off between improvement in compres-
sion and improvement in security. The clusters of prediction
errors are then permuted, with the permutation information
encrypted. Following that an arithmetic coder is employed to
compress the prediction error clusters. Given a start pixel,
the predictions errors, once recovered, allow the image to
be recovered with the aid of the side-information. However,
though the compression performance rivals that of state-of-
the-art, JPEG2000 still-image compression of unencrypted
images, it does rely on significant pre-processing and the
encrypted communication of side information. Thus, though
the encryption-before-compression approach offers greater
flexibility compared to those SE approaches, the majority,
that involve joint encryption and compression, this appears
to be traded-off against performance in terms of the amount
of compression needed and the current restriction to intra-
coded images. The authors of [51] proposed a real-time
protection scheme for HEVC. In this scheme, Truncated
Rice (TR) codes were used for the binarization of Quantized
Transform Coefficients (QTCs), RC codes being one of the
enhanced choices offered by the HEVC version of CABAC.
The solution works by first converting the TR codes’ non-
dyadic Encryption Space (ES) into a dyadic ES. After that
AES encryption was applied to the selected syntax elements.
The solution did not affect the ability of HEVC to oper-
ate in parallel because SE is applied independently to each
and every coding slice. The encrypted bitstream appeared
to maintain the same bitrate as the matching unencrypted
bitstream. In addition, experiments were reported that showed
a very limited computational cost due to encryption.
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TABLE 1. Summary of recently proposed, SE-based encryption schemes, compared with SLEPX.
In [21], practical scenarios in which encryption, water-
marking, transcoding and/or compression are required for the
same video crossing a network. Assuming, as the authors
of [21] do that partial encryption or SE is the acceptable
form of encryption in such circumstances, the authors analyze
the impact of video quality transcoding (through alteration
of the QP) upon watermarks. Notice that error drift through
transcoding has long been the source of analysis in the lit-
erature [4] and consequently, in [21] quality transcoding is
restricted to inter-code blocks to reduce such drift. In the case
of watermarking, the authors of [21] select a compression
domain watermarking method. They determined that HEVC
encoding means that the re-quantization attack, in effect,
of quality transcoding has much less impact on the watermark
than similar transcoding of H.264/AVC streams.
In addition to the above analysis, Table 1 compares
some recent SE-based schemes with the proposed cipher.
Table 1 indicates some targeted applications, features of the
algorithms employed and notes on advantages and disadvan-
tages of these more recent contributions. These are compared
with SLEPX. Further comparisons with SLEPX, concentrat-
ing on SE features, can be found in Table 9.
IV. SLEPX
The following section contains a detailed description of the
SLEPX cipher.
A. SLEPX’S CABAC CONTEXT
SLEPXworks in conjunction with CABAC, which is the only
entropy coder supported by HEVC and, hence by SHVC.
Bypass Binary Arithmetic Coding (BAC) elements (rather
than elements passing through the Regular BAC module) do
not affect context modelling [51] and consequently there is
no context mismatch between the entropy coder and decoder
if the fixed context of the Bypass BAC module is utilized.
Among all six basic HEVC binarization procedures used
in the CABAC coder, only two codes, that of kth order
Exponential (Exp)-Golomb coding (EGk) and Truncated Rice
Coding with context p (TRp) do not result, in general, in an
encrypted bitstream being different in length from the input
non-encrypted bitstream. Not all Truncated Rice Codings
avoid updates of context models, as, for example, the context
level p must be greater than zero [51]. In fact, the pro-
posed cipher (SLEPX) encrypts MVD sign bits (one bit each)
along with the NZ_TC sign bits and the absolute value of
the suffixes (division remainders during coding), which are
binarized by EG0 (NZ_TC sign bits and suffixes) and EG1
(MVD sign bits) respectively, i.e. with k = 0 and 1. SLEPX
exhibits low-computational complexity and, as a result, it has
a reduced impact on processing latency compared to other
ciphers such as AES (see also Section I). Fig. 5 shows
the insertion of SE within CABAC processing. Not shown
in Fig. 5 is reference to context modelling, which takes place
prior to the regular BAC, with retrospective update of the con-
text models immediately after the output from regular BAC
and prior to multiplexing of the output from the various forms
of coding. Encryption by SLEPX takes place by assembling
blocks of bits, selected according to the SE procedure. These
encrypted bits are taken from their blocks and reinserted at
the same place within the input entering the Bypass BAC
module. Given that the key-length for SLEPX is a power of
two, it is important to assemble blocks of SE elements that
are also dyadic, i.e. a power of two. Specifically, for SLEPX
the current key length is 128-bits and thus the assembled
blocks of bits should be 128 bits in length. This procedure
was first described in [51], where it was noted that HEVC
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FIGURE 5. The insertion of SE within the CABAC coder.
(and hence SHVC) (in contrast to H.264/AVC) requires con-
version from any non-dyadic lengths to dyadic lengths. After
dyadic conversion and encryption, the SE bits are reinserted
into the bitstream in such away that the bitstream remains for-
mat compliant. Given the precautions mentioned in terms of
elements selected and chosen binarization method, the result-
ing encrypted SHVCbitstream after BACmaintains bitstream
length and, naturally, decoder compatibility
HEVC introduced the idea of entropy slices, which allows
each slice to be separately coded and decoded. If more than
one slice is defined for a frame, the advantage would be that
entropy coding could proceed in parallel, as all context is
independent for each slice. On the other hand, the data in each
slice that is used to form the context is reduced, implying that
adaptation of the context could be less sensitive for shorter
slices.
B. SUMMARY OF SLEPX FEATURES
SLEPX has the following features:
• The cipher is a symmetric keystream-based scheme;
• For encryption and decryption purposes, the algorithm
normally uses a 128-bit main key;
• For each encryption session, the cipher generates
a different Initialization Vector (IV) by means of
a Pseudo_Random_Number_Generator (PRNG) func-
tion, synchronized between encryption and decryption
modules. Thus, synchronization of the PRNG between
the encryption and decryption modules is also part of
symmetric key exchange management, which synchro-
nization, however, is outside the scope of this paper
the main key and the IV are initially XORed together.
In this way, the XOR function generates a new 128-bit
key (namely the session key), which is split into two
sub-keys (see Section IV-C). This procedure ensures that
every time an encryption session takes place, the process
always generates random results, even when the data are
the same or the main key is the same or both. Exchange
of the main key and either the session key or the two
sub-keys through key management [41] is outside the
scope of the current paper.
• The cipher was developed to work with the SHVC stan-
dard but, in fact, it could easily be applied to HEVC as
well; and
• If the cipher is employed with HEVC then it can behave
like a crypto-transcoder, i.e. a selectively encrypted
bitstream can further be transcoded directly without
showing the original video contents to 3rd parties,
unidentifiable or not, as might happen within a
CDNaaS [56].
C. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
Confusion and diffusion are the fundamental requirements
of any encryption algorithm [57] and SLEPX fulfills both
requirement in the sense that it uses both permutation and
XOR functions. Both functions deal with a selected bitstream
(comprised of binstrings) arranged as 128-bit acts blocks
and transformed into a 128-bit block encrypted bitstream.
To fulfill the confusion property of the cipher, an Initiation
Vector (IV) is used to alter the output for every encryption
session. The SLEPX IV is generated by a PRNG function by
utilizing the session key for each session as a seed, thus gener-
ating a different IV every session, behaving like a One-Time
Pad. Subsequently SLEPX will deliver a different output
for the same session key for each encryption session. The
main reason to use this one-time pad mechanism is to thwart
chosen plaintext and known-plaintext attacks. As previously
mentioned, and as shown in the encryption box of Fig. 6,
the 128-bit key will be Exclusive-ORed (XORed) with the IV.
Subsequently, the resulting modified 128-bit key is divided
into two equal sub-keys (K_1 and K_2 in Fig. 6) (each
64-bits in length).
In many block ciphers, such as AES [16], a Substitution
box (S-Box) introduces a non-linear element to the cipher,
which, unfortunately increases the computational cost of
those ciphers. To make the cipher more suitable for real-
time processing an S-Box function is not utilized in SLEPX.
However, XORing, which is also a non-linear process,
is employed. In fact, the encryption algorithm converts the
selected binstrings into blocks of 128-bits each, through the
dyadic conversion process mentioned in Section IV-A.
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FIGURE 6. Flow diagram of SLEPX. Notice that this diagram only shows the Bypass BAC segment of the video, which is multiplexed with the output of
the Regular BAC etc. It also does not show the application of arithmetic coding to both the Regular and Bypass entropy coded elements (see Fig. 5),
Notice also that for reasons of space the input binstrings have been abbreviated to bins.
The algorithm then splits each block into two halves
(referred to as the RT and LT). The RT and LT sub-blocks are
then separately XORed with sub-keys K_1 and K_2 respec-
tively. The XORed sub-blocks are subsequently permute each
bitwise by a randomly selected offset (namely P_1 and P_2)
ranging from 1 to 9. As indicated in Fig. 6, the type of permu-
tation is a left-wise circular shift, which is easily implemented
in hardware, if need be. Apply the randomized circular shifts
to the outputs of the earlier XORs makes the final output
statistically independent from the results of the former step,
while these permutations also meet the need to include a
confusion step, as mentioned at the start of this Section. After
the permutation step both halves are concatenated to restore
a 128-bit stream of blocks (now encrypted).
Subsequently, the encrypted blocks, after decomposing
back into their binstring parts are combined with the
un-encrypted binstrings to form a bitstream which under-
goes BAC prior to multiplexing with the regular BAC etc.
to form the final output compressed bitstream, in this manner,
a receiver decoder gets a compressed video bitstream which
fulfills the format compatibility requirements, as well as
maintaining the statistical properties of the bitstream, i.e. it is
uniformly distributed, and its length. Moreover, the SLEPX
cipher works effectively in a distributed environment in that it
encrypts sub-parts of the original bitstream independently of
each other. The pseudo-code of Fig. 7 is a confirmation of the
operation of Fig. 6, as it is important to clarify the operation
of a cipher.
The encryption space for the suggested SHVC SE cipher
works on theMVD sign bits, and theNZ_TC sign and suffixes
bits, (the former being discussed in [58]). Arithmetic coding
is very sensitive to errors so that a single alteration in a bit
might cause the entire bitstream to become non-format com-
pliant [58]. As a result, in this research the authors encrypt
the binstring after the binarization process. The impact of
the SHVC based SE scheme is to encrypt the video content
having different layers (for scalable video) by guaranteeing
the same bit rate, format compliance features and real-time
requirements.
D. SHVC OPERATION OF SLEPX
Videos encoded by an SHVC encoder contains base layer
and number of enhancement layers, normally based on one
or more of the three scalabilities of spatial, temporal and
quality at several different resolutions. In SHVC, spatial lay-
ers involve the adjustment of coefficients only. Moreover,
every temporal layer requires the conversion of transform
coefficients, delta QPs (dQPs), and MVDs. Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) layers deal with the conversion of transform
coefficients and dQPs. Such SHVC layer behaviors indicate
that the signs of coefficients (the signs of the NZ_TCs) and
their suffixes are the most appropriate parameters for SHVC
layer encryption, because every kind of scalability deals with
these coefficients. MVD sign encryption is more appropriate
for temporal scalability, but it is significant for all three scala-
bilities, as SNR and spatial scalability is commonly combined
with temporal scalability.
Fig. 8 shows SLEPX operating across multiple layers of
an SHVC encoder. A SLEPX encryption module is inserted
at each layer of SHVC, within the BL and within one or
more ELs.
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FIGURE 7. Pseudocode of SLEPX.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This Section describes the experiments performed upon the
SLEPX cipher upon different video sequences, along with an
analysis of SLEPX’s impact uon those sequences.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The proposed encryption algorithm was implemented
within the Scalable Reference Model (SHM) encoder
version 7.0 [59]. The decryption procedures, the counterpart
of SLEPX encryption, are based upon the improved SHVC
decoder, referred to as OpenHEVC [60]. The results help to
assess the computational cost of the decryption method by
supposing the SHVC decoder to have real-time performance
features. For evaluation purposes, different experiments con-
ducted within common SHVC test environments, as given
in [61]. The detail of the videos acting as test sequences are
mentioned in Table 2. The original raw video sequences for
the experiments were sourced from [62] and [63].
Video frames were encoded into four layers, i.e. the BL
(Layer 0) and three ELs (layers 1–3). The chroma sampling
utilized was 4:2:0 [4] and the encoding method utilized was
Variable Bit Rate (VBR) [4]. We consider four Quantization
Parameter (QP) configurations (QP = 12, 24, 36 and 48).
TABLE 2. Test video sequences utilized.
Objective video distortion in the video samples is described
in decibels (dB) for Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) [64]
for the YUV video signals. Structural distortion in the video
sequences was measured by using the SSIM index [47],
which targets the human perceptual response with a valued
score ranging from 0 to 1.
Figs. 9 (a), (b), (c) and (d) represent the sample encoded
frames, QP = 12, as mentioned in Table 2, along with their
PSNR and SSIM. Then, Figs. 9 (a1), (b1), (c1) and (d1)
present the visual effect arising from SE upon the same video
frames. Thus, Fig. 9 presents the impact of the encryption
technique, which for these frames makes them unwatchable,
though the level of distortion across some frames is vari-
able, as a result of the content characteristics and the syntax
elements selected for encryption. For example, the face in
the original encoded Beauty video frame is highly distorted
in Fig. 9 (a1), although there is little else of interest in the
frame shown.
B. VIDEO QUALITY METRICS
For accurate assessment, the PSNR and SSIM of the men-
tioned video sequences (in Table 2 ) were assessed by lumi-
nance (Y) as well as chrominance (two color components
U and V). Luminance is considered to be the most signifi-
cant element in pictorial recognition. However, chrominance
values of distortion are also given because it is possible that
the chrominance components could be decoded separately, as
a way of establishing the content. Recall from Figs. 4 and
8 that in non-hybrid SHVC, BL and ELs are encoded inde-
pendently of each other except that upscaling for possible
spatial resolution layering and MV scaling in the case of
possible temporal layering, speed up the process of spatial
and/or temporal layering for ELs. If those forms of scalability
are not employed but SNR scalability is applied then the QP
is applied independently of other layers by application of
different values of QP at each layer, with ascending quality
with higher ELs in the hierarchy. Thus, setting a QP value
determines the video quality at whatever layer, making sub-
sequent comparisons across QP settings possible.
For calculation of the PSNR and the SSIM index
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FIGURE 8. SLEPX operating across multiple layers of SHVC.
where MSE refer to the Mean Square Error between the orig-
inal plain video sequence and the resulting processed video
obtained after applying the SE scheme, and x refers to the bits
per pixel. The PSNR can also be found for individual video
frames, rather than averaging the PSNR across a sequence of
frames.
SSIM (a, b) =









In equation (2) the parameters a and b refer to the pair
of video frames being compared, with µa and µb being the
average (arithmetic mean) value of pixel (intensity) within
two video frames labelled as a and b, with σa and σb being
the variance of the intensity values within video frames a
and b video respectively, while σab refers to the covariance.
Variables c1 and c2 are utilized to facilitate calculations when
the denominator terms in (2) are particularly small [47].
It should bementioned that PSNR remains awidely employed
metric when making comparisons between different research
papers on the same video sequence. It is also employedwithin
codecs for estimating the rate-distortion of coding. SSIM is
said to be helpful in reflecting the relative human response
if subjective testing is not available for whatever reason.
Currently it is less widely deployed within codecs.
TABLE 3. Comparison between the PSNR of ‘Plain’ and SE videos, with
QP = 12.
In Tables 3 and 4, with QP = 12, the term ‘plain’ denotes
the unencrypted form of a video sequence, whereas ‘SE’
denotes the encrypted version of the same plain videos. As is
clear from Table 3, the average (arithmetic mean) PSNR of
both the luminance and chrominance components are much
degraded after applying SE over the entire video sequences.
The results for SSIM in Table 4 tell a similar story to that of
Table 4.
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FIGURE 9. Effect of structural distortion in videos with SLEPX at QP 12.
TABLE 4. Comparison between the SSIM values of ‘plain’ and SE videos,
with QP = 12.
The distortion was also evaluated at different QP values.
Recall that the QP controls the granularity of quantization [4],
having values 0–51 within HEVC [7], with lower values
of QP resulting in better video quality. For visual analysis,
Fig. 10 illustrates the video quality of an EL (using SNR
scalability) of video sequences selected from Table 2, namely
Beauty, Four People, MobCal, and Paris at different QPs,
before and after applying SE. SE significantly distorts the
luminance and chrominance components, as is also revealed
by the SSIM scores. As the video quality is better in frames
having QP = 12, then, after encryption, the higher encrypted
ELs introduce more distortion than lower ELs video frame
(QP = 24, 36 and 48). Those scenarios (with higher QPs
or equivalently lower video quality in the plain versions) can
also be seen in Fig. 10. Thus, an encrypted layer having
QP = 48 displays less distortion compared to an encrypted
EL having QP = 12. This behavior is related to the relative
number of syntax elements selected for SE at the different
QPs. Thus, at lower QPs (higher video quality) there are
relatively more of such syntax elements than at higher QPs
(lower video qualities). On the other hand, a video with (say)
QP = 48 is already distorted relative to one with QP = 12.
Therefore, it seems that there is a tradeoff, trading the
amount of distortion from compression against the amount of
distortion from SE.
C. COMPUTATIONAL COST
The time needed to perform the encoding (with and without
SE) using the SHVC standard for reference video sequences
was evaluated, with the results shown in Fig. 11. The addi-
tional time needed to apply the SE procedure on each video
sequence is referred to as encoding delay, found to be on aver-
age 69.19 ms over the set of video sequences. (The delay was
calculated by subtracting the encoding times with SE from
those times without SE.). To the human observer, this average
time may well be imperceptible. However, for much longer
sequences and when processing batches of videos then,
as with all encryption, there is a latency impact. However,
Section V-E.2 will compare the computational overheads
between SLEPX, simple XOR and industry standard AES,
when it will be shown that SLEPX is a good compromise in
terms of confidentiality versus computational overhead.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This Section considers different experiments aimed at val-
idating security aspects of the SLEPX cipher in respect to
standard objectives and measures of security robustness. The
investigations include a histogram evaluation of encrypted
relative to original video frames, edge differential ratio anal-
ysis, correlation coefficient analysis, distribution of selected
encryption parameters, and the linear regression model of
encrypted syntax elements respectively.
1) HISTOGRAM ANALYSIS
A histogram enquiry is a visual illustration of the image
pixel distribution which shows the intensity level of each
color pixel [65]. For an encryption system, comparisons of
histograms of encrypted and original video frames shows the
differences between plain and SE forms. The histograms of
the original video frames taken from the video sequences
under test, i.e. Beauty, Four People, Mobcal and Paris, are
shown in Fig. 12 (a) (c) (e) and (g), whereas the histograms
of the SLEPX versions of the chosen video frames are shown
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FIGURE 10. Impact of visual distortion of SLEPX at different QP levels with respect to various videos. Parts (a1) – (d1) show frames #07, 29, 19 and 35 of
the plain encoded versions of Beauty, Four People, MobCal and Paris video sequences respectively. Parts (a2)-(d2), (a3)-(d3), (a4)-(d4) and, (a5)-(d5)
show the encrypted versions of Beauty, Four people, MobCal and Paris video sequences for the indicated QP.
FIGURE 11. Effect of encoding delay (in ms) of SLEPX at QP = 12.
in Fig. 12 (b) (d) (f) and (h). It is apparent that the histograms
(original and encrypted video frames) are certainly dissimilar.
2) EDGE DIFFERENTIAL RATIO
The Edge Differential Ratio (EDR) estimates the edge
dissimilarities between the encrypted and original video
sequences [66], [67]. The effectiveness of any cipher can be
judged by the impact of encryption upon the edges, which
should not be preserved in the encrypted form of any video
frame.
The mathematical formula used to calculate EDR between
original and encrypted video frame, given as (3) is as follows:
EDR =
6Ni,j=1
∣∣S (i, j)− S̄(i, j)∣∣
6Ni,j=1
∣∣S (i, j)+ S̄(i, j)∣∣ (3)
where S(i, j) and S̄(i, j) are the pixel values of the detected
edges in the original and encrypted video frames. The max-
imum EDR value which indicates the highest confidentiality
according to objective statistics for a given video frame must
be equal to or close to ‘1’ and vice versa the minimum value
is ‘0. Fig. 13 shows the resulting images after using Sobel
edge detection [68] to find the edges for the original images
and after SLEPX was used. The QP was 18, i.e. a high-
quality, before SE. From visual inspection, once SE has been
applied there remains little to be gained applying Sobel edge
detection to the resulting video frames in terms of identifying
imagery within the distorted video frames. In fact, the EDR
values for the selected frames fromMobCal, Four People and
Paris were 0.94, 0.91 and 0.90 respectively, which confirms
the effectiveness of SLEPX combined with SE by showing
that the encrypted and original video frames have EDRs close
to one. Sobel edge detection is a staple method of image
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FIGURE 12. Histograms of original and encrypted video frames selected
from the Beauty, Four People, Mobcal and Paris video seq. with QP = 18.
processing, though there have been many alternative edge
detection methods, a very recent method being the active
contour method described in [69]. Therefore, Fig. 13 is an
estimate of how edge detection might aid deciphering an
encrypted video frame, i.e. have little effect. However, given
that in [69], the active contour method is only tested on three
images, much needs to be done to confirm the robustness of
this very new edge detection method, though comparative
results in [69] indicate that it is promising. Future work
will involve checking whether other edge detection methods
informed by artificial intelligence can improve much in deci-
phering already distorted video frames. There is also the issue
of real-time performance, which was not tested in [69], while
Sobel edge detection is strong in that respect.
3) CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS
In the original plain video frames, the correlation between
spatially adjacent pixel intensity values is high, as the video
sequences are natural images, which usually have statistically
formed from a Markov field of order one [70]. Accordingly,
FIGURE 13. Visual results of EDR of different frames belonging to Mobcal,
Four People and Paris video sequence with SNR scalability and QPEL = 18.
if the encrypted video frames still having a high degree of
correlation between frame pixel values then it is possible
that the contents of the original video frame will be dis-
cernible. Hence, suitable encryption methods always reduce
the correlation among neighboring pixel values after encryp-
tion. Basically, correlation coefficient analysis quantifies the
linear dependency of two neighboring pixels in the same
video frame or matches pixel values in altered video frames
at similar locations [71], [72]. SE combined with SLEPX
results in low correlations between neighboring pixels, as can
be confirmed statistically. The r correlation coefficient can be
calculated by means of eqn. (4):













In (4), n refers to the number of pixels in a video frame,
xi and yi are the intensity values of two pixels at position i
in two different video frames, x̄i and ȳi are the horizontal and
vertical local means and δx and δy are denote the standard
deviation of pixels x and y correspondingly.
To examine the analysis of correlation coefficient of the
SLEPX, the following steps occurred:
• Selection of 1000 pixels randomly from the video
sequences under test (Jockey, Kimono, Four People and
Paris).
• Selection of the equivalent 1000 pixels after SLEPX and
SE at identical locations.
• Computing the correlation coefficient for those
1000 pixels utilizing equation (4).
Table 5 shows the resulting correlation coefficients anal-
ysis for the 1000 pixels. If the degree of correlation (based
on pixel values) between the original and encrypted frames
is high (near to 1) then that shows a minimum level of
encryption; hence, the encrypted data can be compromised
straightforwardly. The correlation coefficients findings for
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TABLE 5. Correlation coefficient pixel values of the Jockey, Kimono, Four
people and Paris between plain and encrypted video using SLEPX with SE.
the SLEPX cipher upon different video frames present partic-
ularly low values, as confirmed in Table 5, thus revealing the
effectiveness of SLEPX cipher in terms of offering protection
through distortion of the video.
4) SCATTERING OF CHOSEN ENCRYPTION PARAMETERS
The distribution of selected encryption parameters within a
video provides better video confidentiality resilience. If syn-
tax elements are chosen that are abundant within a video
sequence and not bunched within a few video frames, leaving
other frames unaffected then the distortion is maximized and
confidentiality is improved. The same consideration is also
significant in respect to resisting cryptanalysis of a given SE
technique, as if the distribution of selected syntax elements
is properly managed and, in addition, the amount of selected
elements is large then it could well be difficult to predict them
all properly, reducing the ability to reconstruct the contents
through (say) a substitution attack.
The extracted statistics shown in Table 6 are from seven
dissimilar video sequences with different file sizes. These
provided the basis for a distribution analysis. The most likely
distribution matching the probability distribution of chosen
syntax elements is a Poisson Distribution because the distri-
bution is discrete, the probability of occurrence of a single
event (a given number of syntax elements for any one chosen
element) does not affect other events, and the count size range
is, in theory, is unbounded.
TABLE 6. Counts of occurrences of selected syntax elements in test
videos.
5) LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL OF ENCRYPTED SYNTAX
ELEMENTS
Regression analysis is a statistical approach that measures the
association between two or more variables of concern. Given
a good fit with a linear model of regression then a proposed
cipher will have an avalanche effect upon confidentiality.
That is confidentiality may well improve linearly across a
video sequence as more and more video frames are added.
To find the linear regression of each of the encrypted syntax
elements compared to the independent variable ‘file size’.
Equation (5) is normally used in linear regression analysis,
in this instance to establish the extent of linearity of encrypted
parameters with respect to the file size [73]:
Y = α + βX (5)
where Y is used as a dependent variable (encrypted syntax
element), X denotes the independent variable (file size) and
α and β are the values of the coefficients computed by
utilizing the available data. Analysis of the linear regression
is conducted by computing 95% confidence intervals for both
higher and lower series. The confidence interval for 95% is
the interval lying between the upper and lower values, within
which there is a 95% probability of finding the population
value, as opposed to the calculated sample value. That is,
based upon the sample values, here for α or β, the confidence
values say that there is a 95% probability that if all possible
file sizes were available (the population) then the values of
α or β would be found within that confidence interval. The
test sequences mentioned in Table 2 with dissimilar file sizes
were used in this experiment. The dependent variable Y takes
its values from the results the number of MVD signs, NZ-TC
signs, and NZ-TC suffixes. Table 7 tabulates the values of
the two coefficients from eqn. (5) along with the confi-
dence intervals. Using those values allows construction of
eqns. (6)–(8) for MVD signs, NZ_TC suffixes and NZ-TC
signs respectively.
Y = 538853.18+ (125.082) X (6)
Y = 26544+ (12.844) X (7)
Y = 2E+ 06+ (1248.5) X (8)
TABLE 7. Linear regression analysis results for MVD signs, and NZ-TC
suffixes and signs.
The effects of the linear regression investigation for all the
nominated syntax elements are revealed in Fig. 14. The two
graphical plots depict the relationship between the number
of MVD signs and NZ-TC signs in relation to the file sizes,
showing that there is a connection between video file size
and the number of a particular encrypted element, though
the connection is firmer for NZ-TC signs than it is for MVD
signs.Moreover, the analysis also concluded that the numbers
of signs of NZ-TC and MVD elements will be very large,
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FIGURE 14. Graphical illustration of linear regression analysis for encrypted MVD signs and NZ-TC signs.
FIGURE 15. Visual Effects comparison of SE (on I, P and B video frames) on both the texture and motion syntax elements with XOR, AES-CFB
and SLEPX on two frames from the Four People and MobCal test videos at QP = 24 encoded with CABAC-based SE. (a1-b1) Original Four
People and Mobcal videos frames; (a2-b2) encrypted with XOR; (a3-b3) encrypted with AES-CFB; (a4-b4) encrypted with SLEPX.
making it difficult to predict these or conduct a substitution
attack. The number of NZ-TC suffixes is not so great, making
this syntax element more vulnerable to such an attack.
E. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION AGAINST OTHER CIPHERS
To find the effectiveness of the SLEPX on the one hand it
was compared with base-level XOR encryption and, at the
other end of the cipher sophistication, industry-standardAES.
Simple XOR can be implemented in hardware for very rapid
block-encryption and introduces a non-linear element into
the processing. Both AES and XORing as a component of
SLEPX were already described in Section IV-C. AES was
used in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) mode [74], which is
one of a number of well-established and common modes
of operation for block ciphers. Similarly to SLEPX, CFB is
initiated with an IV (refer back to Section IV-C). CFB allows
AES to operate as a stream cipher, once the IV has initially
been applied. Thereafter only the key is applied to each block
of plaintext. CFB has the advantage of self-synchronization,
which means that if a block of data is lost, after several blocks
of further input decryption can continue. It has been used
before for CABAC-based SE [51] [37].
Fig. 15 allows visual comparisons of the effect of encryp-
tion by XOR, AES-CFB and SLEPX. In Fig. 15 (a2)–(a4)
and (b2)–(b4) portray the SE of the Four People and MobCal
videos after encryption with the three ciphers. It is apparent
that for XOR encryption, Fig. 15 (a2) and (b2) parts of the
original scenes are still discernible, less so than for SLEPX
in parts (a4) and (b4).
1) COMPARATIVE VISUAL QUALITY ANALYSIS
PSNR and SSIM (refer to Section V-B) were calculated to
make a quantitative comparison between the impact of SE
with the XOR, AES-CFB and SLEPX ciphers. PSNR values
are tabulated in Table 8, results based on the encryption
performed by utilizing both the MVD and NZ_TC based
syntax elements at different QP values. The luminance (Y)
parameter of PSNR of Four People video sequence was
21.28 dB, 10.87 dB and 11.19 dB after SE performed by
XOR, AES-CFB and SLEPX at QP = 12 respectively.
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TABLE 8. Comparison of avg. PSNR (in dB) of encoded plain video and SE with XOR, AES-CFB and SLEPX of diff. videos at QP levels (12, 24, 36 and 48).
This indicates the distortion introduced relative to the YUV
version of the video sequences under test. The value for
simple XOR encryption is relatively high, confirming the
visual impression of Fig. 15. Comparison of all SE using AES
(with PSNR at 10.87 dB) and SLEPX (delivering 11.19 dB),
shows that SLEPX comes close to effect of the encryption
standard AES-CFB. The reader can judge from Table 8,
that the effect is similar across the QPs for all three video
sequences under test, across not just the Y component but for
the two chrominance components.
SSIM index values of different video sequences encrypted
by XOR, AES_CFB and SLEPX are shown in Fig. 16.
The Figure shows that the video sequences CABAC-based
encrypted by AES-CFB and SLEPX have lower SSIM index
values than the XOR cipher. (Lower SSIM index values
indicate better content protection.) Moreover, it is also again
evident that SLEPX delivers similar confidentiality compared
to AES-CFB. Hence, both objective (PSNR) and HVS-based
(SSIM) results indicate that SLEPX renders almost as much
protection as encryption of the SE syntax elements as when
that is performed by AES-CFB.
2) COMPUTATIONAL COST ANALYSIS
In a real-time processing environment, the duration in time of
encryption also plays a vital role in assessing the efficiency
of the ciphers. To assess that efficiency, comparisons were
made of the encoding times of XOR and AES-CFB ciphers
with those of SLEPX. Fig. 17 showing the results of absolute
encoding times for the usual MV-based and texture-based
syntax elements after encryption of SLEPX with respect
to the XOR and AES-CFB ciphers. The Figure establishes
that the encryption of the Kimono video sequence with
SLEPX consumes 997 s, which is little bit more than with
simple XOR (941 s) but significantly lower than when
using AES-CFB (1293 s). In fact, overall timing results
FIGURE 16. Comparison of SSIM values for different video sequences
after SE making use of XOR, AES-CFB and SLEPX ciphers at QP = 18.
demonstrate that SLEPX is approximately equivalent to
XOR-based encryption (with respect to computational time,
though having superior content protection). SLEPX is
clearly faster than AES, while the results from the previous
Section demonstrate a similar level of content protection.
F. CRYPTANALYSIS
This Section considers the possibilities for several common
attacks against SLEPX.
1) DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
A differential attack is particularly critical for any encryption
algorithm. On the other hand, the resilience to key-based
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FIGURE 17. Comparison of encoding time of SLEPX with respect to XOR
and AES-CFB encryption when performing SE.
sensitivity attacks is demonstrated if a minor modification
to the encryption key yields entirely dissimilar encrypted
video frames [75]. The testing scenario against this attack
assumes that there is an original video frame called P and it
is encrypted using a key called K1. If an attacker successfully
decrypts P by utilizing another key, say K2 then this shows
that the key has no worth in the cipher. Assume that the
keys (K1 and K2) are slightly different in the sense that only
one bit (the most significant bit) is dissimilar in K1 and K2.
Fig. 18 shows the result of encrypted a test video frame by
utilizing K1 and decrypting it not by K1 but by K2 from
Fig. 18, it seems likely that a distorted frame will be the result
of decrypting with a different key, however similar that key is
to the correct key.
2) BRUTE FORCE ATTACK
A Brute-Force attack or exhaustive search attack tries out
every possible key until a plausible plaintext is found. The
key space size of a key is 2n, where n is the number of bits
in the key, which herein is 128 bits. Assuming that Moore’s
law of an effective doubling of computing speed every two
years continues to hold and quantum computing does not
replace conventional computing for this type of problem then
it will be approximately 100 years before this size of key
can be broken within one second. Therefore, encryption with
SLEPX and other 128-bit keys are effectively immune to this
type of attack [76], which constitutes approximately 5% of
all successful attacks.
3) KNOWN AND CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
AKnown Plaintext Attack (KPA) can take place if an attacker
has in their possession both the encrypted data and the
original video frames used to generate the encrypted data.
However, even if an attacker is able to identify the video
frames encrypted from their distorted versions, which seems
unlikely, see Fig. 15 a4-b4, they would have the problem of
identifying from the ciphertext, which of the elements had
actually been encrypted. That is because (see Table 6 and its
commentary) the encrypted elements, as a result of the com-
pression process, are randomly scattered within the ciphertext
in a close approximation to a Poisson distribution. In addition,
applications of SLEPX are mainly real-time ones in which
the video data could well lose its practical significance before
another key, through effective key management, is applied to
a fresh streamed video. Thus, unlike situations in which a
KPA has been successful, such as attacks against the pkzip
method of ‘encryption’ in which unencrypted stored files
could be processed using the same encryption key, that situa-
tion is unlikely in video streaming scenarios. Besides, unlike a
simple cipher such as pure XORing in which the key is simply
XORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, there is
no simple relationship between the key and the ciphertext.
Instead the plaintext is first compressed and in practice the
key for each SHVC layer (see Fig. 8) will be different.
A Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) is a subset of the Known
Plaintext Attack. However, a Chosen Plaintext Attack addi-
tionally requires access to a video server or other video gener-
ating device. It is possible then that an artificial video could be
constructed with (say) all blank video frames. However, even
if no tampering checks were in place, SLEPX involves the
same encryption processes as AES (see Section IV.C) in the
sense that confusion and diffusion take place. LikeAES it also
has a non-linear step, in SLEPX’s case through XORing and,
importantly, an IV is used for every stream. In fact, it is the
last two features that effectively thwart any PTA or CPA by
making the relationship between (compressed) plaintext and
ciphertext non-linear and by restricting the amount of plain-
text available to an attacker before the stream configuration
changes again.
G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PRIOR RESEARCH
To evaluate SLEPX relative to previous research, this
Section contains a comparison with other CABAC-based SE
schemes. Table 9 summarizes the comparisons, with the basis
of the comparisons given in the note beneath the Table.
In [46], not all syntax elements work with SE but the balance
between the growth in confidentiality relative to the growth in
bitrate for similar video quality is analyzed. TheHEVC-based
encryption scheme discussed in [46] does not follow the con-
stant bit-rate property but is considered robust to transcoding.
The solution discussed in [51], offers an HEVC-based
solution that uses the AES cipher. However, the scheme has
not been applied to the layered architecture of SHVC and the
use of the AES cipher increases the computational cost con-
siderably. Hence, though CBR encoding, especially two-pass
encoding, can be slower than VBR compression, it is prefer-
able in situations in which bandwidth is constrained, such as
in wireless sensor networks or during TV channel multiplex-
ing. In [58], the authors applied the RC6 cipher for encryption
over HEVC binstrings in comparison with multiple modes of
AES. RC6 can be used as an alternative of AES, but still
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FIGURE 18. Test based on key sensitivity analysis for Stefan frame #21. (a) Showing the original encoded Stefan frame. (b) Encrypted frame after
utilizing the key K1; (c) Decryption performed by utilizing dissimilar key namely K2.
TABLE 9. Evaluation of SLEPX compared to recent SE-based practices for video codecs.
RC6 is computationally expensive (with suggested at least
12 rounds of operation of RC5) than the proposed SLEPX.
The authors in [77] works with basic encryption (XOR with
addition) and also applied chaos for output. Chaos is compu-
tationally expensive when applied in conjunction with XOR
encryption, consequently much degrades visual quality.
Generally, the SLEPX structure integrates a multiple
rounds of permutations and XOR cipher for use with SE
applied to CABAC binstrings within SHVC layered encod-
ing. Alternatively, recent techniques of encryption having
some weaknesses in terms of efficiency, bitrate overhead and
computational complexity and may be fulfilled by electing
weak encryption parameters.
H. DISCUSSION
The SLEPX cipher is a robust approach that works to
secure the confidentiality of the scalable version of HEVC.
From the results, SLEPX has shown itself to be a suitable
alternative form of encryption, compared to time-consuming
full encryption of either the complete stream or, especially
herein, of selected components of the compressed visual
data, whether that video stream is transmitted or held in data
storage. The effectiveness of the cipher was judged in this
Section by its response to different requirements. The visual
quality of SLEPX encrypted video frames has been exam-
ined in terms of objective and perceptual video-quality met-
rics, demonstrating that ciphered frames have significantly
distorted appearances. Experiments also demonstrated that
SLEPX has a competitive encryption rate, while offering a
moderate to high level of confidentiality. Thus, the cipher
compared well with state-of-the-art AES, in that SLEPX
approaches the security of AES but consumes less compu-
tational resources, compared to a rudimentary (and insecure)
XOR cipher. In addition, the SE algorithm has the potential
to be tunable by trading off some parameters so as to extend
to a greater range of applications. For example, for devices
with very limited capability then some of the CABAC syntax
element types to be encryptedmight be neglected. This would
reduce the confidentiality of the SE but would also reduce
the SLEPX encryption task, thus reducing the computational
burden on a low capability device (refer back to Table 6).
Equally, for those applications for which security guarantees
are important it may be possible to augment the types of
CABAC syntax elements encrypted. As the trade-offs in that
respect are likely to be complex, this aspect of the research is
reserved for future work.
The need for video encryption continues to grow, espe-
cially for real-time applications such as video surveillance,
as was indicated in Section I’s initial discussion of video
encryption applications. Such surveillance is close to becom-
ing a necessity [78], not just within obvious venues such
as airports and railways but within many private houses
and business premises, especially in countries where polit-
ical unrest exists. Developments such as classification of
objects within video frames and the intelligent tracking of
those objects thereafter has increased the desirability of such
surveillance. Additionally, cheap, high resolution cameras
with small form factors also add to the deployment of video
surveillance. On the other hand, without encryption, alter-
ation of video frames has become relatively easy because
187804 VOLUME 8, 2020
R. A. Shah et al.: SLEPX: An Efficient Lightweight Cipher for Visual Protection of SHVC Extension
of the widespread dissemination of image-processing soft-
ware. In addition, legal constraints of privacy protection for
streamed video are being put in place across the world, such
as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [79], whichmandates the employment of encryption,
rather than other measures, in all except the simplest of video
streaming contexts.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an innovative cipher, SLEPX, for
lightweight selective encryption over the scalable extension
of HEVC, namely SHVC. Based on the results of Section V,
SLEPX offers a robust, efficient, and format-compliant
video content protection for compressed SHVC bit-streams.
To avoid any impact on encoder/decoder synchronization SE
is applied at the final entropy coding stage of SHVC with
careful choice of encrypted syntax elements. Thus, the pro-
posed privacy protection solution works by selecting signifi-
cant syntax elements i.e. MVD signs, as well as the NZ-TC
signs and absolute value of the NZ-TC suffixes from the
CABAC coder at each SHVC layer. Comparison of SLEPX
with other ciphers, i.e. industry-standard AES at one end
of the block-encryption spectrum and simple XOR at the
other end, was made on different grounds (objective video
quality, subjective video quality and computation time, which
impacts upon overall communication and storage latency).
That investigation revealed that the SLEPX cipher offers a
sufficient (moderate to high) level of protection, which is
approximately as secure as AES, while the computational
cost is almost as minimal as results from XORing. Linear
regression testing was applied on the counts of the selected
syntax elements from CABAC, the SHVC entropy coder,
showing that the selected syntax elements are sparsely dis-
tributed within a video frame and among all frames. In fact,
because of this scattering, video distortion is widespread
across video sequences. SLEPX works with SE both for
single-layer HEVC and the multi-layer version of HEVC
(SHVC) with all three scalabilities (Fig. 1 & Section IV-D).
The cipher is based on the concept of a joint crypto-
transcoder, which means that encrypted bitstreams may be
transrated at a later time without revealing and compromising
the original contents of single-layer encoders.
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